Balancing the books: The realities of Western air defence

Many new companies have entered the air defence field with their products, which aim to reduce the cost of interceptions and increase the rate of production. But these approaches seem to miss some of the fundamentals of air defence, which this article seeks to address. 

Most nights in Ukraine, the air raid alerts are issued through apps and audible alarms as Russian missiles and hordes of Shahed or Geran strike drones wind their way towards the country’s infrastructure. Ukrainians wearily make their way towards the nearest shelter, take cover in their bath or closet, or find a stairwell. They wait until the Air Force says the attack has ended, which can often take as long as seven hours as successive waves of missiles and drones enter Ukrainian air space. Some take chances, preferring to wait for warnings of 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles, or Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles to take shelter. Those weapons have the lowest interception rates. 

Most of these attacks play out on social media for the whole world to see. The progress of the missiles is typically reported, region-by-region through the Air Force’s Telegram account: https://t.me/kpszsu. Successful strikes are often caught on camera, the huge explosions echoing through the city like a thunder storm that is directly overhead. Perhaps it is because the footage of the strikes is so easily accessible, or because the threat feels uniquely close to home, that many companies have now emerged with new air defence weapons. One of them, Frankenburg Technologies, was recently the subject of an article in the Telegraph. “The tiny rocket set to protect Europe from Putin,” the title proclaimed, before setting out some of the statistics on the company’s Mark 1 missile. The article gives the sense, as have several other new companies working in this space, that the West is somehow defenceless against Russian strike drones, and incapable of producing a cost-effective response. This article sets out to address three of the key points these articles and claims seem to raise or miss: 

1. The West cannot produce cost-effective air defence, comparing Tamir and Mark 1. 
2. Cost per intercept is the key decider. 
3. Ukraine is not NATO.

Part 1: The West cannot produce cost-effective air defence. 

The Telegraph article gives the Frankenburg Mk 1 a price of $50,000, contrasting it with the recent defence against Shaheds that flew into Poland. “They fired missiles worth around £500,000 ($655,800) to intercept Shahed drones each worth less than a tenth of that, and failed in half the attempts,” it states. Not a good look is it? 

But the reality is that this is an extremely narrow view of western air defence capabilities, and a misrepresentation of the response to the Polish air incursion, which we will return to in Part 3. The Frankenburg Mk1 sits in the category of very short-range air defence (VSHORAD), which is a category including missiles like the FIM-92 Stinger, RBS70, and air defence cannons like the Rheinmetall Skyranger. Typically they can reach out to around 5 or 7 km and are designed to engage low-flying aircraft, rockets, and missiles. Their use is generally a sign that a layered air defence system has struggled to intercept a threat at longer range. Frankenburg has an engagement range of 1.9 km and can reach an altitude of 1.6 km, flying at 338 metres per second (750 mph). It is built using commercial components and the company states it has an intercept rate of 90% in just half of the 53 tests it has conducted. This is deliberate, according to Frankenburg CEO Kusti Salm, it is designed to compromise on performance compared to existing western systems to reduce price. 

This is all well and good, MANPADs and other VSHORAD missiles are expensive if viewed solely through the lens of cost, which is also wrong – as we will see in Part 2. But it fails to take account of what is already available. Perhaps most well-known is Israel’s Iron Dome, which has been defending Israel from Hamas and Hezbollah rocket attacks since 2011. Iron Dome is built around 3 to 4 launchers each carrying 20 Tamir interceptor missiles, which cost between $40,000 and $50,000 each, according to CSIS. A battery can defend an area of 150 square kilometres, and it has conducted tens of thousands of successful interceptions with a 90% success rate. The interceptor isn’t all, Iron Dome includes several advanced systems designed to assess whether or not a rocket is a threat based on its trajectory, which means some rockets will be left to fly their route. It can detect targets out to ranges of 70 km and has an engagement range of at least 10 km. So, not only is it proven operationally, but it reportedly has the same cost as Frankeburg’s Mk 1 and can intercept at longer ranges. This interception range is key – remember it. 

• Shahed and Geran: The evolution of Russia’s deep strikes – Calibre Defence 
• Short range air defence, more critical now than ever
• Not a pretty picture; the UK’s air defence to improve with Sky Sabre order 

The range and altitude of the Frankenburg missile – as reported by the Telegraph – would likely be overcome with simple adjustments to the flight profile of a Shahed-type munition. They were originally flown close to the ground, helping them to hide from Ukrainian radars in the ground clutter, but making them vulnerable to Ukraine’s mobile air defence teams with heavy machine guns and cannons. The flight altitude was adjusted leading to a decline in the efficacy of those mobile air defence teams. However, platforms like Skyranger, Triton Mk 2, and Gepard can engage targets at ranges up to 4,000 metres depending on the calibre of the cannon. Estimates vary, but the advanced air-bursting rounds these guns fire are likely no higher than the $1,000 mark per shot, and would likely require up to ten shots to bring a Shahed-sized target down. 

One further option is the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), which is a laser guidance kit developed by BAE Systems. It is designed to be fitted to existing 70 mm unguided rockets for a range of purposes including to intercept drones. It has been used by the US Air Force in this capacity since 2019, and displayed on an MQ-1 for a counter-drone interceptor. The cost is variously estimated at around $70,000 per kit. 

This is a brief, non-exhaustive overview of what the West has to offer in terms of VSHORAD. Suffice to say, the West has options and is capable of building systems to defend itself against hordes of Shaheds. While the introduction of new players to the field is welcome, because it brings competition and different options for MoD’s to test and choose from, the suggestion that the West is somehow defenceless is incorrect. It is the case that the West hasn’t invested at scale in this technology – although Germany’s Skyranger procurement looks set to change that fact. But it is not the case that cost-effective technology does not exist. 

Part 2: Cost per intercept is the deciding factor 

It is hopefully obvious that comparing the cost of an interceptor to the threat is a fairly useless metric. But in case not, let’s explore the outcome of Russia’s strikes on Ukraine. The Kyiv School of Economics estimated in 2024 that Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have caused $56.5 billion in losses, including $16 billion in direct physical damage. The think-tank estimates that it will cost $50 billion to rebuild the energy infrastructure alone, which Ukraine has already done several times. The damage across Ukraine is estimated to be around $176 billion, with the bill to repair frontline cities and other things that have been destroyed, approaching $524 billion.

For reference, the PAC-3 MSE air defence missile fired by the Patriot air defence system, which is often held up as the most expensive missile, costs somewhere between $5 million and $8 million. The cost depends on who is buying it with the US Army generally getting it for less. PAC-3 is often included in these analyses, as it is in the Telegraph’s Frankenburg article, but the fact is it is not designed for Shahed interceptions. If Ukraine has used them in that role, it was likely because there was no other option and the cost of failure was high. They are otherwise reserved for cruise and ballistic missiles that require an exquisite interceptor, so are not a fair or proper comparison for cost-effective VSHORAD. Anyway, with those price estimates, you could buy 11,200 PAC-3s for the cost of the damage inflicted to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure at the lower end, and 8,000 at the higher. Air defence is not about the cost per intercept, it is about the cost or impact of failing to defend against a strike. For example, Ukraine could let the energy infrastructure be destroyed, choosing not to defend because it is too expensive. In that example, Ukraine’s defence industry would quickly grind to a halt, its will to resist would decline, and its political and military leaders would probably have to live underground. It would be the path to Ukraine losing the war. 

• Ukraine intel: Russia has 250 of the Iskander ballistic missile in stock 
• Lockheed Martin’s missile production in numbers 
• Third Su-34 batch of 2025 continues Russia’s rearmament 

In a nutshell, air defence was never meant to be cheap, it is meant to defend things that are hard to replace or would lead to a country losing a war if damaged. This includes things like airfields, power stations, ships, and nuclear missile submarines. Take the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier, estimated to cost $13 billion to design and build. They carry up to 90 aircraft and it took eight years to build the first, and will average six years per ship after that. If lost, it would be very difficult to replace the thousands of tonnes of steel, 4,200 crew, 90 aircraft, and nuclear reactor that powers the ship. An anti-ship ballistic missile could cost as little as $2-3 million, and Russia’s Iskander ballistic missile which can engage ships according to past reports, is produced at a rate of 60 per month. The SM-3, which can intercept this type of missile, costs around $28 million. The reason for this is that SM-3 must work, it cannot fail. If it fails, thousands will die and a war could be lost. Should the US leave missiles to hit the USS Gerald Ford to be hit by enemy missiles because the interceptors are too expensive? No, of course not. And it is unlikely anybody is making that comparison. But the point stands, the impact of losing the ship would be far greater than the cost of building it, and could lead to a negative trend in a US war effort. 

So, I will grant that there is a need for a cost-effective interceptor against threats that can be amassed and brought to bear against a target in a coordinated manner. However, continuing to contrast the cost of the threat with the cost of the interceptor is unhelpful – we should be focused on protecting what is key to a war and what is not, which leads us to Part 3 and our conclusion.

Part 3: NATO is not Ukraine

In the Telegraph article Salm refers to the thousands of critical infrastructure sites in Europe, contrasting them with the cost of defending against the Polish incursions. The conclusion is obvious, we can’t defend all of these places at this price point. 

He’s right, we can’t. But there is a whole world of nuance missing from the analysis. First and foremost,  NATO is a defensive alliance that is currently not at war. This cannot be emphasised enough. During peace time, an air force has to clear its skies of civilian aircraft, make sure that what it is seeing is actually a threat, coordinate with partners to explain what is happening, and then decide upon a safe way to intercept the threat without showering a city below with fragments of missile and drone. It cannot simply fire an air defence missile from the ground and move on. Poland’s response to Russian drones flying into its airspace was entirely appropriate and correct. A crewed aircraft with well-trained pilots making the final intercept is how a peacetime intercept of a threat should be conducted. 

• Russia and the strategic challenge to the North – Calibre Defence
• The Russian Aerospace Forces and deterrence – Calibre Defence 
• No Spear 3 for British F-35B before 2030 – Calibre Defence 

It is not how Poland or NATO would respond to war. I will come back to this, but first let’s address Salm’s concern about all of the critical infrastructure in Europe. There is a lot of it, but Russia’s ability to target it all is limited. If it chose to target everything, it would have to dilute its available effects which would make even limited air defences more effective. This is not how Russia would fight, and it is not how NATO would defend. Russia would likely target NATO’s air power, and its air defences. It is a difficult pill to swallow, but if Russia did choose to attack urban centres as well as airfields, nuclear forces, and military infrastructure, NATO command would have to choose between defending soldiers and defending civilians.  It would not, and should not defend everything. Arguably, defending NATO’s air and naval power would ensure that NATO could fight back and eventually win. Failing to protect those assets and losing hundreds of aircraft in the first few days of a war would guarantee defeat. So, NATO would be very unlikely to spend all of its air defences protecting cities and critical infrastructure, whilst leaving its war-fighting equipment exposed. 

And finally, there is the consideration that NATO is not Ukraine, and it would fight a war differently to how it conducts itself at peace. Ukraine has made ingenious use of long-range drones and its limited supply of cruise missiles to hamper Russia’s war-effort. But its throw weight is nothing compared to NATO, and Russia’s approach to Ukraine is likely far more risk-averse than it would be against the alliance. Russia’s air force – the VKS – would have to push its fighters forward. Right now, Russian fighters and bombers sit safely within their own air defence umbrella, avoiding Ukrainian fighters and air defences as much as they can. They would not have that luxury in a war with NATO and would be pushed into the mix first to try and shape the war. NATO would likely respond with its own offensive counter air campaign to degrade the VKS and its long-range strike capabilities. This would be essential to a war with Russia, regardless of the cost or scalability of the interceptors, NATO cannot afford to sit and try to wait out Russian strikes.

So, overall, I want to restate that the addition of new players to the air defence market is welcome. It adds competition and new approaches to solving the challenges that will define our societies for the generation to come. But, many of the statements and claims around new capabilities and their use cases need to be treated with caution and set well within the context that they would be used.That’s it, thanks for reading if you made it this far! 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on November 12, 2025. The lead image shows a Norwegian NASAMS air defence system engaging a simulated target in 2023. Credit: US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US Sixth Fleet.