British Defence and the Pink Mountain

In the lead up to DSEI, Calibre Defence set out to produce a magazine. That magazine covered many of the major projects and procurements underway in the British MoD, covering 30 programmes ranging from new mortar systems to nuclear submarines, and airborne early warning and control aircraft. 

In the course of creating that magazine, one thing became incredibly clear – there are immense challenges ahead for the British armed forces. It is common to lay the blame on a particular government, or the MoD’s commercial arm, as if a collection of civil servants has somehow conspired to frustrate some of the largest and most complex military engineering programmes on Earth. Instead, a survey of these 30 programmes shows that successive governments have encountered pink mountains and turned a blind eye. 

Let me explain. 

In Douglas Adams’ “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” series, the “pink mountain” isn’t a physical object described in detail, but rather an example used to explain the concept of a “Somebody Else’s Problem” (SEP) field. An SEP field is a sophisticated form of cloaking device that doesn’t make an object invisible, but rather makes it unnoticeable. The idea is that if something is designated as “somebody else’s problem,” people will instinctively avoid perceiving it or dealing with it. An explanation offered is that if a mountain were painted pink (making it quite conspicuous) and an SEP field were erected around it, people would simply walk past it, around it, or even over it, without ever truly registering its presence. Their brains would simply process it as something that doesn’t concern them, hence “somebody else’s problem,” and effectively filter it out of their awareness. It’s meant to be a humorous take on human selective attention and bureaucracy; however, the British armed forces now have an entire range of pink mountains and the SEP field is beginning to fail. 

By 2030, the MoD will have to retire and replace most of its major land platforms and equipment. A good portion of what exists, such as Warrior and Bulldog, are too old to effectively maintain and lack many of the assets needed to really fight a modern war – such as a stabilised cannon. The replacement for Warrior is expected to be Boxer, which is a good platform, but expensive and lacks the lethality and mobility of Warrior. The youngest of the MoD’s 6,000 Land Rovers is 30 years old, with a fleet availability that is perishingly low and a significant proportion reportedly not safe to be driven. They are just one element of the estimated 9,000 vehicles that could or should be replaced under the very large Land Mobility Programme. This is to say nothing of the scheduled replacement of the SA80 assault rifle, the new requirement for increased short-range air defence and mortars and, of course, the procurement of new howitzers so that 3rd Division can properly resource its indirect fire needs. 

The RAF has retired many of its aircraft without suitable replacements, ranging from its Puma HC Mk 2 helicopters through to the E-3D AWACS and Tornado multirole aircraft. The last meant that the Typhoon fleet had to be upgraded to undertake land-attack roles, which is probably fine, but 49 Tranche 1 aircraft were retired in 2025. This is expected to improve availability of the other 107 in the fleet, but is nonetheless a significant reduction. Additional F-35s are being procured, which is good, but at present they can only carry air-to-air missiles and Paveway guided bombs, reducing their utility against Russian air defences. There are, however, new drones. The MQ-9B Protector has flown in the UK for the first time, at the same time, the Houthis have claimed to shoot down 15 US MQ-9s since 2023, raising questions over the utility of this significantly delayed programme. 

The Royal Navy did not escape, either. At one point it was to be reduced to a single aircraft carrier, the build of which was running late because of delayed decisions and its numbers of Type 45s have been cut to six instead of the expected eight. Plans emerged to retire older Type 23s, but First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Tony Radakin told the Defence Select Committee in 2021 they would stay, keeping the number of escorts at a minimum of 17. Then, in May 2024, the Conservative government announced that three Type 23s would be retired by the end of 2025 anyway. HMS Lancaster was withdrawn in July, leaving just seven in the fleet. The first Type 26 is not scheduled to enter service until 2029 and the first Type 31 in 2027, leaving the fleet low on escorts for at least four years – maybe more. 

Many of the programmes above, as well as those that are covered in the magazine, have been delayed, revised, cancelled or a combination of all three over the past 15 years. Successive Strategic Defence Reviews (SDR) have spelled out how combat power – represented by the number of ships, aircraft, or tanks – would be reduced. To be fair, every time a government has created a new pink mountain, the opposition has been quick to point it out, only to double down on those decisions once in power themselves. They often start by building their own SEP fields: “the opposition left us in dire economic straits,” they proclaim. But politics demands saying it will be ok, because drones, AI, and advanced technology will make up for the reduced numbers, and the world is less dangerous anyway, the SDRs would say. 

Multiple “capability holidays” have been taken as a result. Now it is so expensive and difficult to come back from those holidays that significant trade-offs are likely to be required to address them. Those trade-offs will either come from the MoD’s own budget, meaning more “holidays” and gaps, or from the British taxpayer, who will have to make do with fewer hospitals and schools. The end result is a dramatic and disastrous reduction in British fighting power, at a time when defence and security are of paramount importance for national prosperity. 

It’s not all bad, though: new and innovative defence companies – some of which you can read about in this magazine – have flocked to the UK, bringing investment, expertise and new approaches to capability. The Labour government has taken some definitive steps, increasing defence spending and making big decisions on procurements, with some priorities like munitions clearly defined. But there is a long and difficult road ahead, with many immense programmes to deliver simultaneously. Hopefully, the MoD and the government will be able to grapple with the Pink Mountain that is 15 years of delayed, deferred, and cancelled procurement, in order to set up a new generation of deterrence and capability for the armed forces. 

In the meantime, if you would like a copy of the Calibre Defence magazine, which provides an overview on many of the most important programmes within the MoD, please get in touch via admin@calibredefence.co.uk. 

Thank you for reading and supporting Calibre Defence. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on September 15, 2025. The lead image is AI generated and shows a pink mountain made out of defence equipment.