Denmark to procure long-range precision weapons for OCA

Denmark’s government is exploring ways to procure long-range precision weapons to establish offensive counter-air (OCA) capabilities as it looks to deter Russia and prepare the country to defeat Russia’s own long-range strikes. Some details of this shift in the country’s posture were announced in an article released on the Forsvarsministeriet (MoD) website on September 17. 

“Together with the ground-based air defence, Denmark is strengthening its ability to partly counter threats from the air, but also to more actively combat threats far from Denmark. With this decision, the Defence Forces will now find out how we can best purchase and integrate long-range precision weapons at home,” Minister of Defence, Troels Lund Poulsen said. 

The announcement continues to explain that experience from Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of being able to strike an enemy in its own territory, as well as providing a robust air defence. Denmark has placed several orders for air defence systems, which are to have several purposes. One is to support the Danish Army’s 1st Brigade when deployed, another is to protect critical infrastructure, and the third is to provide protection for allied forces if Denmark is used as a host nation for reinforcements in a NATO context. 

The long-range air defence will be provided by the SAMP/T NG system, which is in service with Italy, France, and Ukraine, and is a European alternative to Patriot. Two batteries are understood to have been ordered, which will fire the capable Aster 30 air defence missiles from MBDA. Short- and medium-range systems will round out the ground-based component, along with the air-to-air capabilities of Denmark’s 37 planned F-35s, which are based out of the Skrydstrup airbase. The airbase will also be defended by some of the GBAD assets, and the Danish surface fleet will also contribute to the country’s air defence.

However, as noted in the Danish government’s announcement, simply defending against an enemy’s attacks is generally a poor choice. This is because it allows an adversary to set the tempo for a conflict and pits the relatively simple production of strike missiles, like the Kh-101 and 9M723 Iskander, against the very complex production of air defence missiles. “It is necessary for the Armed Forces to be able to counter threats before they reach our territory. It is about giving the Armed Forces the right tools to solve the task. We are getting that now,” Denmark’s Chief of Defence, Michael Wiggers Hyldgaard, said in the press release. 

This is key. Consider Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, for example, which is understood to have damaged a large quantity of Russia’s strategic bombers on the ground. The bombers themselves are difficult capabilities to replace, but they are also expensive to counter with air defence. A Tu-95MS, which NATO calls Bear, can carry up to 14 cruise missiles, all of which could reach Denmark if launched inside Russian airspace. The Bears are frequently used in Russia’s airstrikes against Ukraine, and a flight of four could release in excess of 50 missiles as part of a large coordinated strike. Defeating those missiles alone could cost around €50 million. Russia is thought to be able to produce more than 100 cruise missiles per month, while the accelerated plans for Aster 30 predict 18 months per missile. So, a sustained passive approach focused on intercepting cruise missiles is unfeasible. Striking those aircraft on the ground with long-range precision weapons, however, reduces the numbers of aircraft available and can quickly degrade an adversary’s airpower.  

Options for Denmark’s long-range precision weapons

“With the government’s decision in principle, the Ministry of Defence Materiel and Procurement Agency will now begin investigating the market for which long-range precision weapons best suit Denmark’s needs,” the press release states. So, what kinds of weapons could fit this bill? 

Well, despite being relatively close to Russia, the options are somewhat limited assuming a preferred launch from within Danish airspace. The distance to the Olenya airbase, which often hosts Russia’s strategic bombers, is around 1,800 km from Denmark. Just reaching the border of Russia is a distance in the order of 1,000 km. This likely indicates that an air-launched missile will be necessary, and Denmark has already entered into talks to acquire the JASSM-ER (range in excess of 900 km), according to an Aviation Week article from 2024. However, it is worth noting that a large JASSM-ER order was placed by the US in August this year for export customers, and did not include Denmark. 

The Naval Cruise Missile from MBDA is likely to have a range in excess of 1,000 km, and the Tomahawk family of land-attack cruise missiles has a range up to 2,500 km into Russia, and are helpfully already deployed in land- air-, and ship-launched configurations. Finally, South Korea also produces the Hyunmoo-3 family of cruise missiles, which are also available in air-, land-, and ship-launched configurations with ranges up to 1,500 km. 

An alternative option could be the development of low-cost weapon systems that are conceptually similar to the Russian Geran-2. MBDA’s own One-Way-Effector has a range of around 500 km, but this can be increased with the size of the effector, as Russia and Iran have demonstrated. And more recently, MGI released initial details of TigerShark, its design for a cost-effective cruise missile with a range of 750 km. There are a number of long-range precision weapons that could potentially fit the bill, but a lot will depend on how far Denmark intends to project force beyond its borders. 

Calibre comment

There are a few different routes for Denmark to follow in its long-range strike capabilities. If it was expecting to act alone, then it would probably be necessary to develop options for land, air, and sea. This would be very expensive and likely reduce the magazine depth available. In an ideal world, Denmark would work with other NATO partners to procure complementary capabilities that will meaningfully contribute to the magazine depth available. It may be preferable, for example, to buy 500 air-launched cruise missiles, rather than 100 each for land, air, and sea. 

Another element to consider is that OCA is a very firm and often under-appreciated element of Russia’s own air defence planning. It assumes that it will only be able to succeed against NATO if it is able to deliver significant damage to NATO air forces on the ground. This can extend up to the use of tactical nuclear missiles in the early phases of a conflict, depending on which source you consult. Denmark’s plan should, in that context, be welcomed and other NATO states encouraged to seek out similar capabilities. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on September 22, 2025. Credit for the lead image is FMV and shows from left to right, Minister of Defence Troels Lund Poulsen, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen