Germany to sink €1.37 billion in land-based Tomahawks

As Germany firms up its plans to procure ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, this article looks at what the procurement brings to NATO, and if it is worth the cost.

Germany is planning to acquire 400 Tomahawk Block Vb land-attack cruise missiles and the Typhon mid-range capability missile launcher under plans seen by Politico, according to an October 27 article published by the outlet. But is it worth it? 

The system in question is known as the Mid-Range Capability and has been developed specifically to equip the US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF). The Typhon is derived from the largest version of the Vertical Launch System (VLS) Mk 41, which is used on naval vessels, and features four launch containers on a semi-trailer. A battery consists of four launch vehicles for a total missile complement of 16 without reloads. The Tomahawk procurement is valued at €1.15 billion, with €220 million allocated to the Typhon procurement (approx £1.19/$1.59 billion in total). 

When German Defence Minister, Boris Pistorius, officially requested the systems back in July, he explained to journalists that it would provide a range of 2,000 km and serve purely as a deterrent. He left open the question of the missile that would be used. However, the Politico report, combined with articles published earlier this year by Calibre partner, Hartpunkt, confirms that Tomahawk is the obvious choice. 

European nations, including the UK, France, Poland, Sweden, and Germany, are working together to develop a new long-range ground-launched missile under the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA), which could eventually replace the Tomahawk. Denmark has also recently expressed an interest in procuring long-range strike capabilities, which could be met by ELSA or the Tomahawk.

As part of the wider Bundeswehr procurement, which totals some €377 billion (approx £329/$439 billion), the Typhon launchers and Tomahawk missiles are a relatively small percentage, but stand out for being procured from abroad, rather than through a domestic company. This largely reflects the lack of any weapon development in Europe that can meet this type of range and capability. 

Calibre comment: Is it worth it? 

Russia has its own ground-based cruise missile launcher called the Iskander-M, which is capable of firing cruise missiles out to 2,500 km. Credit: Russian MoD

There are a few aspects to this question. The first is really a case of what Germany intends to do with the missiles. Pistorius has said that they are for deterrent purposes, but it is not clear that Russia would perceive them as such. Russia’s own approach to deterrence prior to 2022 relied upon the ability to escalate use of cruise missiles to deliver calibrated strikes against NATO. The idea was that doing this would prevent some nations from joining a war for fear of massive retaliation. At the very least, it would be used to shape a conflict in Russia’s favour. Moreover, its strikes against Ukraine have failed to curtail the war, and show that thousands of missiles are needed against a prepared and determined adversary. Equally, Ukraine’s own strikes against Russia’s industrial hinterland have failed to alter Russia’s own approach. 

Another element of deterrence to consider is credibility. You have to appear credible in your ability and willingness to use the weapons and means at your disposal to deter an adversary. Germany certainly has a lot of work to do on the latter element. Its refusal to supply Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine will have shaped attitudes towards the country and its actions in the event of a war between Russia and NATO. The second element could also be challenging. The US Army’s MDTFs rely on Joint All Domain Command and Control to coordinate with other services and strike targets at the extreme ranges that the Typhon and Tomahawk allow. They are also operating in very different terrain that allows for a variety of reconnaissance methodologies that would be difficult to counter. Germany, however, would not be able to push reconnaissance assets over Russia, at least, not at the beginning of a war. It would therefore be entirely reliant upon space-based and human-based reconnaissance for its targeting. 

This is not necessarily a big deal, but it does confine Germany to targeting Russia’s defence industry and defence infrastructure. This then crosses back into the first issue – how willing would Germany be to do this in the event of a war? But it also crosses into a second, which is the maths behind cruise missile strikes. As we have stated previously, it can take a lot of missiles to destroy a target. The US launched 59 Tomahawks at Syria’s Shayrat Air Base in 2017, leading to extensive damage, but the base was used to generate sorties just a few hours after the attack. Regardless of the outcome, it suggests that Germany would only be able to attack eight airbases with its Tomahawk stockpile, assuming that Russia failed to shoot any down, which is not a safe assumption to make. In a nutshell, this procurement is likely beneficial to NATO as a whole, but the quantities involved, Germany’s political approach to using long-range missiles, and Russia’s own experience of Ukraine’s strikes, suggests that the presence of additional cruise missiles so close to Russia’s border is unlikely to be more of a deterrent than the combined airpower of NATO and its nuclear weapons. 

There are some further elements to consider, however. The systems would, of course, be deployed as part of a hopefully integrated and coordinated NATO response. As long as NATO can address its suppression of enemy air defence shortfall (especially with a reduced US presence), then the Tomahawks would add a meaningful long-range capability when combined with other forms of airstrike. Simultaneously, the procurement could help to signal Europe’s greater commitment to its defence spending and burden, which has become a lingering sore in the bloc’s relations with the US. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on October 27, 2025. The lead image shows a battery of Typhon launchers with their launch cells elevated. Credit: Darrel Ames/US PEO Missiles and Space.