How can light forces fight and survive on the modern battlefield?

No matter which conflict you study, the past ten years has witnessed a dramatic increase and democratisation of lethality. Calibre Defence and ST Engineering explore how light forces can succeed on this more lethal battlefield. 

By Calibre Defence in partnership with ST Engineering. 

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In 2017 whilst in Ukraine, a large soldier in a striped t-shirt leant over to show me his phone. On the screen was footage from his small drone equipped with a thermal imager, it was tracking a small group of infantry and soon dropped a grenade that exploded close to them. This was the first time I had seen a small drone used in this way. He explained that the practice had been live in Ukraine for some time, with both sides using small drones to find and strike. Then, in 2018 a series of videos emerged from Syria as Turkish forces deployed their Bayraktar TB2s as part of Operation Olive Shield. Light infantry in open fields and urban developments were located, isolated, and engaged. In a matter of weeks, Turkish forces claim to have eliminated more than 1,000 terrorists. 

This success was seemingly replicated by Türkiye’s Operation Spring Shield in February 2020; a cross-border operation in the Idlib Governorate of northwestern Syria against the Syrian Armed Forces. TB2s backed by electronic warfare and long-range artillery quickly identified and eliminated Syrian soldiers as they tried to approach the areas of combat. Later that year, in September, Azerbaijan launched its offensive to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. Once more, Armenian light infantry bore the brunt of the Azeri strikes, setting the conditions for the ultimately successful offensive. 

At the same time, light infantry carried much of the fighting to retake Mosul from the Islamic State in 2016. Iraq’s capable and effective M1A1 Abrams tanks came unstuck, suffering heavy casualties to ISIL’s hit and run tactics. Light infantry again came to the fore during the 2017 battle of Marawi in the Philippines. There, the soldiers were reliant on what firepower they could take with them and some air support, which proved difficult to coordinate. And of course, in Ukraine, light infantry tactics now dominate the efforts of both sides. Drones like the DJI Mavic are so prevalent that almost every part of the front is watched for most of the day, one Ukrainian CTO told me. The focus on the logistics routes to and from the frontline is extra intense, which means that heavy conventional vehicles are extremely vulnerable. Mobility is the order of the day, and without it, infantry are unlikely to survive the waves of FPVs, artillery, and air strikes that have become the primary means of war-fighting. 

Light infantry; Essential, but vulnerable.

This presents something of a conundrum for light infantry forces, they are both essential to war’s most difficult operations, but more vulnerable than they have ever been before. “I would not want to be in the infantry today,” a former soldier who has visited Ukraine told me. Part of the challenge arises from the way that light infantry are equipped and enabled, and the approach that industry has historically taken to meeting their needs. 

The soldier should be seen as an integral part of the networked fighting force. If properly equipped and enabled, they are the leading edge of situational awareness and decision-making. Ukrainian forces, for instance, are able to rapidly share information between forces using what is essentially a veritable zoo of different communication devices and means. They also embrace commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and systems that can quickly deliver results in their frontline operations. Starlink is an obvious example, but it is not alone. Ukrainians use commercially available jammers and spectrum analysers, which they integrate into their vehicles in a bid to improve situational awareness. 

However, Ukrainian units are very decentralised, with the MoD having very little control over how some units choose to equip themselves. They essentially have the freedom to plug whatever they want onto a vehicle and use it in the way that meets their needs. This approach improves the survivability of light infantry forces by allowing them to quickly switch vehicles – a Toyota for an Opel, for example – and continue the fight. It also means that they can adapt at the pace of delivery, there is no complex integration made necessary by vendor lock, or procurement decisions made many decades ago. They are also able to adapt their strike packages, introducing FPVs and other loitering munitions into their order of battle based on the best available supplier, or perhaps their own ability to build and design drones at the frontline. 

This system is complex and varied, with differences between units and sections of the frontline. But it shows that making light infantry survivable relies on two things: An ability to adapt quickly, and properly enabled soldiers. The existing defence industry can address some of these needs, but a new, more flexible approach could provide much greater survivability and lethality for light infantry forces. 

Introducing the Light Recce-Strike Concept 

Drawing on these insights, global technology, defence and engineering group ST Engineering  set out to develop the Light Recce-Strike Concept, an end-to-end solution for light forces designed to provide them with a reconnaissance strike ecosystem that can set the conditions for an unfair fight. The base vehicle is a 6×6 Land Cruiser that represents the system’s modularity, showing that it could be rapidly integrated and scaled onto any vehicle within an existing order of battle. 

At its core are open integration pathways and COTS components to provide a system that can be rapidly adapted to changing customer needs. The UltraEAK® Electronic Architecture Kit from Ultra PCS, developed by Ultra PCS and who ST Engineering work with as a technology partner, is GVA/NATO-GVA compliant and provides the digital backbone of the Light Recce-Strike Concept; it enables the rapid integration of other systems and capabilities through the UltraPGI software, which includes an open architecture API (Application Programming Interface). Unlike a closed API, which is restricted to a select group of developers or partners, an open API is public and has open documentation, enabling a wider range of applications and services to be built on top of it. The UltraEAK also means that other systems, like Sitaware, which is already in service with the UK, could be easily added to the vehicle. Either way, the system brings light infantry into a digital targeting web. The lethality is designed to support light infantry with organic, multi-purpose firepower. 

The ADDER remote weapon station that is mounted on the 6×6 provides direct fire support as well as a counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capability. ADDER can be armed with 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm machine guns, as well as automatic grenade launchers. Its fire control system includes automatic target tracking and surveillance, target tracking and touchscreen target designation. ADDER can also be fitted with optical and RF jammers for use against small drones, further improving the survivability of light role forces. 

As part of the concept, a TAURUS Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) can be added to the system to perform as a logistics carrier or as a power generator amongst other things.

The Ground Deployed Advanced Mortar System (GDAMS) completes the Light Recce-Strike Concept’s lethality complement by providing a 120mm mortar for indirect fire support. GDAMS includes a  base plate and recoil mechanism, and deploys from the rear of the vehicle in 15 seconds. It is connected to a fire control system and can fire between 10 and 15 rounds per minute. GDAMS has a suite of advanced ammunition available including a guided round. It can fire rounds out to 9 km depending on the nature and means that light infantry could use the vehicle to resource a variety of fire missions. That could be, for example, a first-round strike against a high value target, or area suppression in support of infantry during an assault. 

The base vehicle is of course highly mobile and flexible, but this capability package could be integrated onto any platform. ST Engineering developed and produced the Light Recce-Strike concept in a matter of months, not years, and could repeat that process for new vehicles, or new systems if required. The rapid development of the Light Recce-Strike concept builds on ST Engineering’s depth of experience innovating solutions and adopting technologies to deliver effective and reliable solutions. The Light Recce-Strike concept is designed to leverage an existing ORBAT and commercially available vehicles so that light forces can be rapidly upgraded, at the pace of relevance. Together, these elements form a robust, networked and deployable force package—ideally suited to the demands of NATO light infantry and partner nations seeking to enhance their survivability, lethality, and operational tempo in complex, multi-domain environments. This is more than a collection of systems; it is a fully integrated recce-strike mission capability enabled by ST Engineering.