Lithuania details border defence plan

Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence has released some details of its border defence plan in an August 14 post on X.com. An infographic breaks the country’s border region into three echelons, with the 1st echelon coming immediately behind the border. It marks a continuation of Lithuania’s efforts to limit Russia’s ability to move freely in the opening hours of any military operation. 

Lithuania has a very different geography than Ukraine, which would likely prevent a multi-pronged offensive, but it could still be rapidly overrun without defences that help to channel an invading force, slow its movements, and generally counter its mobility. 

Already, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland have withdrawn from the Ottawa Treaty, which prevented them from using anti-personnel mines. Lithuania and Estonia have also signed an agreement on developing counter-mobility measures along their borders with Russia. This is part of a broader “Baltic Defence Line” initiative that also includes Latvia and will be operationally linked with Poland’s “East Shield” project.

Connected to this, in September 2024, the Lithuanian MoD announced that it had received Sentry anti-tank mines from Forcit Defence, a Finnish company under a €5.9 million contract. By December 2024, Lithuania was anticipating an investment of €600 million over ten years in the project to improve counter-mobility measures for its border defence. These figures are understood to have been revised upwards, and are now closer to €1 billion, reflecting how quickly the situation has changed. 

Lithuania’s plans for border defence would likely be designed to channel attacking forces for engagements by howitzers and MRLs. Credit: Lithuanian MoD

The newly released images provide more detail of how those measures would be deployed. The first echelon is stated to be around 5 km deep, consisting of a closed border control point, an anti-tank ditch that runs across what was presumably a road, with layers of barbed wire before and after it, as well as Dragon’s Teeth anti-tank obstacles and fortified positions. Further positions will be prepared behind them, providing defenders with room to relocate as positions became untenable. This is meant to provide a blunting effect for the country’s border defence. 

The second echelon extends to a depth of 20 km, including the first echelon, and includes additional drainage ditches, bridges prepared for demolition and parks for engineering equipment that would presumably be used to prepare additional defences in the lead up to any confrontation. There are other fortified positions indicated on the diagrams supporting infantry in the border defence. 

The defences are essentially replicated for the third echelon extending to 50 km, which would easily encompass Vilnius if measured from the border of Belarus. Those defences assume that trees will be felled along the roads leading to urban settlements, and bridges blocked or demolished as well as fortified strongpoints. 

Supporting this plan, Lithuania also announced another €10 million order for additional anti-tank mines, although the manufacturer is not stated, and 155 mm ammunition, according to an August 14 press release. 

A layered border defence is a common approach to a known threat. Border defences provide resilience and limit initial casualties while also enabling small teams to hold an enemy’s armour at risk – perhaps with the Carl Gustaf M4s ordered by Lithuania – for example. However, it is important to bear in mind that Russian firepower in that scenario would be very different to what it is now, as its forces struggle to make significant gains against Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely amass considerable firepower before any offensive against NATO forces, and use it extensively to try and shape an operation in its favour before taking any steps across a border. This would lead to losses and a change in the shape of the defensive battle. That said, it is probably preferable to engage in a battle like that from pre-prepared defensive positions, than it is from shell scrapes in the same place. 

Calibre comment

As was the case with Ukraine, any escalation in hostilities with Russia would likely take place over a series of months, providing defenders with the time to prepare more robust positions. There are only some things that Russia could do to reduce that strategic warning as it simply takes time to relocate and prepare the hundreds of thousands of personnel that would be required. 

The defensive posture is interesting because it reflects the extent to which the Baltic states are taking greater responsibility for their own defence. One fear under previous iterations of NATO planning was that Russia would be able to take the Baltics before NATO was ready to respond, and by that point there would be a growing push to stop the alliance intervening. Or, at the very least, NATO forces would take their time preparing for a counter-offensive, during which the Baltic populace would be open to the abuses that have been observed in Ukraine and all of Russia’s other modern wars. Building these defences ensures that Lithuania will have the best possible position to defend itself and prevent that from happening; alongside its significant procurements of new equipment and development of an armoured division, of course. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on August 18, 2025. Credit for the lead image is the Lithuanian MoD.