Mind the gap: The RAF and the E-7 Wedgetail

When NATO goes to war, it typically starts from the air with the goal of achieving some form of air superiority. AEW&C aircraft like the E-7 Wedgetail are critical to that mission. But the UK has retired its E-3D Sentry fleet that previously performed the role, and now there is a dangerous capability gap. 

In July 2021 ZH103 landed at RAF Waddington having completed the last ever operational mission of the UK’s E-3D Sentry fleet.The maiden deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth, from Gibraltar to Suez, was also the E-3D’s last operational deployment. The aircraft was officially retired from RAF service the following September, creating a gap in the force’s ability to provide airborne early warning and control (AEW&C). It was expected that the E-7 Wedgetail would enter service in 2023, but that timeline has slipped and the programme appears to be struggling. No big deal, you might think; how important could that capability be? Well, there are two lenses through which you could look at this: one is from an adversary’s perspective; the other from the roles that the E-3D Sentries performed. 

What does Russia see?

When the Russian military looks at NATO, it sees one primary threat which is the Alliance’s airpower. Hundreds of fourth and fifth-generation aircraft that are all very capable air-combat platforms and equally problematic in terms of their long-range strike capabilities. Russian planners assume that a war with NATO would start with what they call “a massed aerospace assault;” hundreds of planes generating thousands of sorties a day, coupled with the extensive use of cruise missiles and long-range strike against critical infrastructure, defence infrastructure, and the Russian Air Force. This has shaped Russian thinking and it shaped Soviet thinking, too. They have taken the time to understand the capabilities that make a massed aerospace assault possible, and one element of that is often referred to by western analysts as “big wing enablers.” 

This is a broad category of aircraft and includes things like Voyager, the RAF’s tanker used for air-to-air refuelling, as well as the P-8 Poseidon, which performs an important role in anti-submarine warfare. Other platforms include the R-135 Rivet Joint, an electronic warfare and signals intelligence aircraft which has, presumably, contributed to Ukraine’s situational awareness in its efforts to evade Russian air defences, and of course the E-3D Sentry and similar AEW&C aircraft. Russian planners are understood to have assessed that these aircraft together are key enablers of NATO’s airpower, so it stands to reason that destroying or degrading them would unhinge the Alliance’s ability to generate those thousands of sorties. 

To that end, Russia and China have developed and produced a range of air defence and air-to-air capabilities built to engage big wing enablers. The S-400 air defence system, for example, has demonstrated the ability to intercept tactical aviation at ranges exceeding 140 km in Ukraine. This in itself is a remarkable feat for an air defence system, and already enables Russia to control Ukraine’s airspace up to the Dnipro River, according to a November 2023 article written by then General Zaluzhnyi in The Economist. In that same year, Russia announced the procurement of 1,000 of the 40N6 air defence missiles designed for the S-400. These missiles offer a range up to 380 km against “aerodynamic targets”, which realistically means big wing enablers operating at high altitudes. 

They significantly extend the S-400’s range over the 48N6DM, which can reach 250 km. From Pskov in Russia, the 40N6 could theoretically intercept larger NATO aircraft flying over Lithuania, easily covering Estonia and Latvia. If deployed towards the border of Belarus, it could cover much of Poland. But the S-400 isn’t the only system in operation: the R-37M air-to-air missile is credited with long-range kills against Ukrainian tactical aircraft, and would easily be able to take down larger platforms at 100 km or even more. Russia has also developed a range of electronic warfare platforms like the Krasukha-4, designed specifically to target and degrade the communications links used by AEW&C aircraft. China is developing similar capabilities; the PL-15 air-to-air missile, for example, is estimated to have a range of 200 – 300 km against big wing enablers, and the PL-20 is thought to exceed that. 

The role of the E-3D Sentry

With all of that in mind, it should be relatively clear that big wing enablers play a critical role in supporting western operations: why else would an adversary develop weapons specifically designed to counter them? But it is also worth reviewing the operational deployments of the RAF’s E-3D Sentry fleet, which further illuminates the capability gap created by the fleet’s retirement: 

• Balkan Conflict, 1992 – 1993: RAF E-3s deployed to monitor the airspace over Bosnia and the other countries of the former Yugoslavia –  248 sorties flown in support of Operation Deny Flight, which enforced no-fly zones. 
• Kosovo, 1999: NATO maintained three E-3 orbits over Kosovo at all times, the RAF fleet provided 25% of those, according to an article published by Key Aero. The roles included supporting link-ups between fighter aircraft and their tankers. 
• Afghanistan, 2001: RAF E-3s deployed from Oman to support US efforts in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. They provided the recognised air picture over Afghanistan for the Combined Air Operations Centre in Saudi Arabia. They later supported airspace control as combat operations continued. 
• Iraq, 2003: Four E-3Ds deployed for Operation Telic and the invasion of Iraq, contributing to the counter theatre ballistic missile mission. They later coordinated close air support for troops on the ground. 
• Libya, 2011: RAF deployed two E-3Ds to provide situational awareness and airspace management. They worked with up to 150 aircraft at a time supporting refuelling and strike missions. 
• Iraq, 2015: The E-3 fleet deployed once more to support operations over Iraq in Operation Shader. They were sent to provide command, control and coordination for coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. 
• Gibraltar to Suez, 2021: The E-3D fleet flew from Cyprus in support of Carrier Strike Group 21 as it transited from Gibraltar to Suez. 

Operationally, it is apparent that the RAF’s E-3D fleet has made many valuable contributions to the UK’s and NATO’s deployments since coming into service. The value of the aircraft type is also reflected through exercises. In one NATO exercise in 1996, the UK’s E-3D was targeted by the opposition force, and was subsequently assigned no less than 12 fighter aircraft for its defence – further evidence of the critical roles these aircraft play in wartime. 

Wedgetail stalled?

The E-3 fleet’s availability was low by 2020, with the mid-life upgrade programme having been cancelled in 2009. The type was expected to be maintained in service out to 2035 under the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, and the contract for five of the E-7 Wedgetail as a replacement was then signed in 2019. It was initially expected that the E-7s would be in service by 2023, but the number of aircraft was reduced to three under the 2021 Integrated Defence Review, meaning that only one would likely be available for operations. By 2022, entry into service had slipped to 2024, then it was the end of 2025 by 2024. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review recommended an increase in Wedgetail numbers, which in principle the Labour government has accepted. 

In June 2025, the UK news outlet Defence Eye reported on several interactions with DE&S and the MoD, which indicated that the one relatively complete E-7 Wedgetail in the UK had flown only three times. Two of those flights were to and from Southend airport, where it was painted in the RAF livery. None of the flights had tested the powerful radar on the airframe, which is central to its capability. Its last flight, at that time, was October 2024 and none of the other two aircraft under construction had flown at all at that stage. It seems that there are ongoing technical and supply chain challenges with the programme, as well as issues with the workforce converting the aircraft in the UK. The expected entry into service is late 2025, the Secretary of State for Defence told Parliament in a written answer in January 2025. However, with no flight tests conducted by the middle of the year, it is unlikely that date will be met. It is unfortunately probable that the E-7 will not enter service until 2026, or possibly even later. As a programme, it stands as yet another example that taking a “capability holiday” is a poor concept that proves difficult to reverse when subject to external pressures in replacing them. 

In the short-term, it may not matter much. The UK is a member of NATO’s AEW&C Force, which is expected to provide that capability if required before the E-7 comes online, the MoD has said. However, when the full range of British capabilities in all domains are taken into consideration, it is apparent that a great many capabilities have been ‘gapped’, some more critical than others.

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on October 6, 2025. This article was originally published in the Calibre Magazine, which was first distributed at DSEI. If you would like a copy of the Calibre magazine, please contact us via admin@calibredefence.co.uk. 

The lead image shows the first RAF Wedgetail to be seen in the force’s livery from October 2024. Credit: AS1 Nile Austin/UK MOD © Crown copyright 2024.