Operation Roaring Lion: Hezbollah’s FPV campaign against the IDF
Hezbollah is ramping up a campaign of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Israeli vehicles in Lebanon. The strikes suggest the organisation has fast-tracked its adoption of this technology and adopted some of the more recent advances seen in Ukraine.
By Sam Cranny-Evans, editor of Calibre Defence, published on April 27, 2026.
Hezbollah has conducted more than 27 FPV attacks against Israeli forces in Lebanon since February 2026. This is according to analysis collected by Federico Borsari, a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. In an article written via the Militant Wire, he covers the attacks and what they have engaged.
Of the 25 he had recorded by April 21, 2026, 22 were against Israeli vehicles with the majority targeting Namer APCs and Merkava tanks. The two attacks he has documented since also target vehicles. The capability to launch FPV attacks is not new to Hezbollah, which deployed them to some extent in 2024, Federico explains.
The videos show tactics familiar from Ukraine. An FPV pilot follows an Israeli protected mobility vehicle through grainy video footage in one. Diving at the end of the video, which is then cut, preventing analysis of the strike. The lack of footage from an observer drone suggests that they are launched independently.
As is typical of Hezbollah footage, there is no way to confirm the results of these strikes. However, it is reasonable to assume that strikes against lightly protected vehicles would result in casualties. Whereas those against Merkavas are less likely to have been successful.
What is Trophy doing to stop them?
The Trophy active protection system carried by most Israeli heavy vehicles has been modified to intercept drones. However, it is not clear if the upgrade has been rolled out across the entire force. Without that upgrade the system’s radars, which are designed to filter out targets flying at lower speeds, might not see the drones. This would give them free reign to fly close to the vehicles, assuming the crew does not see it first.
However, it is worth noting that the primary munitions arming the Hezbollah FPVs are PG-7 warheads or Iranian equivalents. These munitions are lethal when they hit the right part of a heavy vehicle, but unlikely to achieve anything against the better protected aspects.
Tech profile: Hezbollah FPVs
Image showing an FPV in use with Hezbollah. It is carrying a PG-7 warhead. Via X and Hezbollah media releases.
One notable aspect of Hezbollah’s FPV usage is that the organisation already has fibre optic control links in use. This indicates that it has learnt something from the lessons of Ukraine, and deployed systems resilient to jamming. Judging from the low quality of some video footage, however, it seems that not all of the FPVs are fibre optic.
As is the case in Ukraine, they are largely homemade. Federico notes that some of the systems have18650 lithium-ion battery packs to extend flight endurance. He adds that they appear to use seven- or nine-inch frames with iFlight XING-family motors. As noted above, the primary munitions are from the PG-7 family and Iranian equivalents. There have also been some documented attacks of drone-dropped munitions on Israeli forces. But FPV strikes remain the dominant form of attack.
Calibre comment: What do Hezbollah’s FPV strikes mean for the IDF?
The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have significantly expanded their operations in Lebanon under Operation Roaring Lion. There are more IDF vehicles and personnel for Hezbollah to strike with FPVs as a result. But it also means there are more IDF assets placing Hezbollah under pressure. The Ro’em self-propelled howitzer, for instance, was first used against an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) team.
- Israel uses Ro’em howitzer in first combat mission
- Operation Roaring Lion: Netenyahu orders expansion of operations in Lebanon
The net result is likely a mixture of Hezbollah scoring occasional successes, and the IDF scoring its own. We can say that in theory, the FPV gives Hezbollah some flexibility that ATGMs do not. FPVs typically offer increased range over an ATGM and can be operated with a lower profile. A pilot might sit inside a basement, for example, which reduces the risk if the team is engaged.
Unlike guided missiles, FPVs also mean that they do not have to expose themselves during launch. And – as is often the case with missiles – wait at that launching point until the missile hits the vehicle.
FPVs = poorer situational awareness
This means that the two elements IDF heavy armour relies upon for situational awareness will be reduced: Point of launch detection, and missile range. The Trophy system can provide an approximate indication of where a missile was launched from. If desired, the turret of a Merkava can be automatically slewed to face that direction. Because very few ATGMs have greater range than a tank, the ATGM crew can then be engaged.
If, however, Trophy is unable to detect the FPVs, and those FPVs are launched from outside of the tank’s range anyway, then the IDF will have to find new methods to find them. Without some form of intervention, it is probable that Hezbollah will succeed in constraining IDF movement around southern Lebanon. And, if it is able to effectively target the logistics routes supplying the armoured formations, it could cause extensive losses and operational difficulties for the IDF.
The lead image shows a screenshot of a Hezbollah video showing an FPV strike.
