Operation Roaring Lion: Netenyahu orders expansion of operations in Lebanon

Israel is set to expand its operations in southern Lebanon as Operation Roaring Lion enters a new phase. It’s not the first time the IDF has entered Lebanon with this goal, will this time be different? 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, editor of Calibre Defence, published on March 31, 2026. 

In a major video statement from the IDF Northern Command on Sunday, March 29, 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu officially ordered a significant expansion of Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.

“I have now instructed to further expand the existing security zone in order to finally thwart the threat of invasion and to push the anti-tank missile fire away from our border,” he said. The defence minister, Israel Katz, said last week that the Israel Defence Force (IDF) would take control of territory up to the Litani River. This is around 30 km, and is understood to be made up of three zones, according to The Times of Israel:

1. Lebanese border villages, which Hezbollah uses to infiltrate across the border. 
2. The second and third line of villages that are used to fire anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli towns. 
3. The Litani River, which would put most Hezbollah rockets out of range. 

The operation is an extension of Operation Roaring Lion and seems to be a follow-on from Operation Northern Arrows. It includes several hardened IDF units like the 36th “Ga’ash” Armored Division. This division led an armoured advance during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and has been extensively involved in the war with Hamas. 

In addition, the 810th Mountain Unit has crossed from Syria into Lebanon on foot, according to the Israeli MoD. Moving from the Syrian Hermon ridge toward the Mount Dov area, the 810th swept positions and identified infrastructure intended to support future attacks, the MoD said on March 29. 

What has changed? 

This marks a shift in Israel’s Lebanon operation. Previously, the IDF had limited goals of establishing a buffer and pushing Hezbollah out of ATGM range. But Netenyahu is now, “determined to fundamentally change the situation in the north.” This implies a lasting degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities in the region, and a prolonged deployment. 

Other announcements from Israel have emphasised the procurement and production of munitions in anticipation of a longer war. This follows the surprise of 2023, where the IDF was limited in some of its options by the availability of munitions. Now, however, efforts to bring munitions into Israel have been underway for months. By March 26, over 200 flights and ships had brought in 8,000 tonnes of equipment and munitions. The Israeli MoD has provided regular updates on these shipments stating that the air bridge is coupled with increased domestic production to sustain Operation Roaring Lion. 

In short, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Israeli government is viewing the expansion of operations in Lebanon as a long-term prospect. There is no indication that it is unreasonably expecting a short and successful war. 

Israel’s operational record in Lebanon is mixed 

The Israeli forces have established a buffer inside of Lebanon before. The 1982 invasion was intended to push the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 40 km back from the border. Operation Peace for Galilee as it was known, was intended to provide some breathing room for Israeli settlements that were within range of PLO rockets. Peace for Galilee succeeded in some of its aims, namely pushing Syrian forces out of Lebanon and the PLO back. But it had a major unintended consequence, which was the rise of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah rose to prominence from amongst a number of militias in Lebanon. It gained support for its strident attacks against Israeli forces, and continued this even after Israeli forces withdrew in 1985. After Peace for Galilee officially came to a close, Israel maintained a buffer on the border with Lebanon and kept forces inside the country. Hezbollah continued to attack those forces, which led to a long occupation, ending only in 2000. Several campaigns during the occupation aimed to stop rocket fire into Israel, but the operation overall was seen as a failure. Mounting casualties and public discontent led to the withdrawal and handover to UN forces. 

Tensions continued to mount, and Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 2006 triggered another invasion. Israel’s forces were poorly organised for that conflict, and met Hezbollah’s anti-tank guided missiles and underground infrastructure. Progress was slow and the goal of destroying Hezbollah’s military capabilities in southern Lebanon was not met, nor were the kidnapped soldiers released. 

Operation Northern Arrows was launched in 2024, a year after October 7. Hezbollah had launched thousands of rockets into Northern Israel, and the operation set out to stop that. It targeted Hezbollah’s leadership extensively, leading to a severe degradation of the insurgency’s capabilities. 

Calibre comment: How attainable are Israel’s goals in Lebanon?

Unlike previous operations in Lebanon, Israel’s security forces have succeeded in causing extensive damage to the structures that made Hezbollah work.The senior leadership has been rooted out with many of them killed. The ongoing ground campaign as well as air strikes since 2023 have likely degraded its infrastructure and lower ranking personnel. Technically, it is reasonable to assume that the IDF, now with two years of high intensity warfare under its belt, is capable of creating the 30 km buffer zone goal. Moreover, the damage that has been inflicted on Iran may reduce the aid that is made available for Hezbollah’s recovery. In short, the odds of Operation Roaring Lion providing Israel with a measure of peace appear quite high. 

However, there is an important note of caution, and that comes from the way organisations like Hezbollah tend to work. David Kilcullen, author of The Dragons and the Snakes, observed that insurgent organisations often lack a set structure. He argues that rather than seeing these groups as single homogeneous organisations, they should be seen as a collection of cells. Knowledge may pass between the cells, but is more likely to be contained within a group of around 30 individuals. This means that a cell might be eliminated, but the overall fabric of the organisation remains effective. Furthermore, the rest of the cells will likely learn from the survival pressures they are exposed to. For example, it would be surprising to find Hezbollah using pagers again in the near future. 

In a nutshell

In a nutshell, the IDF is likely to succeed in significantly degrading Hezbollah’s potential to cause harm. That is not to say that the organisation will be unable to fire missiles, drones, and rockets at northern Israel. Simply that its ability to do so will likely be significantly reduced. However, to retain that buffer, the IDF will likely have to provide a permanent presence in Lebanon with boots on the ground. In the past, this has been a magnet for ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and kidnappings.

We are doing our best to provide analysis, news, and insight into Operation Roaring Lion, and Operation Epic Fury. You can find a selection of other articles below. Clicking on these links and reading them really helps Calibre out, so thank you. 

• Operation Roaring Lion: Israel orders thousands of shells – Calibre Defence 
• Operation Roaring Lion: Israel increases ammo production – Calibre Defence 
• Operation Roaring Lion: Israel preps for next phase – Calibre Defence 
• Operation Epic Fury: How the Gulf’s allies have responded – Calibre Defence 
• Operation Epic Fury: Charting the role of the MQ-9 Reaper – Calibre Defence 
• Iran expert: “Successful popular uprising unlikely” – Calibre Defence 
• The Houthi Dilemma – will they join Iran’s conflict? – Calibre Defence

The lead image shows Israeli soldiers deployed to Lebanon during Operation Roaring Lion. Credit: Israeli MoD.