Short range air defence, more critical now than ever

Developments in drone technology make it clear that short range air defence is now critical. This piece analyses both the threats and the UK’s SHORAD options.

From Ireland to Ukraine, Syria, and even Haiti, drones are having a significant impact on the combat and security landscape. Unprepared forces are finding that counter-measures to these systems can be difficult to bring to bear. Once active, those same counter-measures may require constant updates to stay relevant and effective. At higher altitudes, cruise missiles, one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles are now used in their thousands by state-backed insurgents such as the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Russia has developed an expansive array of long-range missiles and drones that it uses to target Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure and, occasionally, its armed forces. 

Because of these developments, it is abundantly clear that ground based air defence and short range air defence (SHORAD) is now critical for both deployed forces and homeland defence. At the tactical level, drone technology can be rapidly developed and iterated to evade jamming, and has already demonstrated its ability to inflict significant casualties, for example on Turkish-backed forces in Syria. This example is important for the British Army, perhaps more so than Ukraine, because it indicates that even when deployed against a sub-peer force, they should expect to take casualties from small drones. The Royal Air Force demonstrated the ability to intercept and shoot down Iran’s drones and cruise missiles during the April 2024 attack against Israel, and the Royal Navy its ability to defend against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. And yet, in simulations of Russia’s initial missile strikes against Ukraine, the UK’s Air and Space Warfare Centre found that the UK could not defend itself, according to remarks made by Air Commodore Blyth Crawford, head of the RAF Air and Space Warfare Centre at the RUSI IAMD conference in April 2025. 

The UK has some GBAD capability, but most of its Stormer short range air defence systems and missiles have been donated to Ukraine. A worthy cause and they have no doubt contributed to preserving Ukrainian combat power against Russia’s drones and attack helicopters. The gap left by those donations is being replaced by the Ground Based Air Defence programme, the subject of this article. 

The GBAD requirement – SHORAD

The GBAD programme includes two requirements; one for short-range air defence and another for counter-UAS. The former is expected to be armed with missiles, either the Thales Starstreak, known as High Velocity Missile in British service, or the Lightweight Multi-role Missile (LMM), also from Thales. This would make it suitable for engaging helicopters, class 2 drones, and fixed-wing aircraft that are flown very close to the ground. Helicopters have proven to be exceptionally vulnerable to short-range air defence systems in Ukraine, a fact that was likely already well-known, but has never been demonstrated so publicly before. That said, the Russian Ka-52 armed with pods of 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided missiles has also been able to stop or slow down Ukrainian advances by quickly destroying columns of armour. So, while it – and other similarly sized targets – are vulnerable systems, they remain important to address. 

Perhaps more pertinent than rotary-wing strike assets is the class 2 drone. This is a larger system than a DJI Mavic, and is represented in Russian service by the Z-16 and Orlan-10 or Orlan-30, among others. The Zala 421-16E (Z-16) and Orlan-30 can provide laser designation and reconnaissance for the 152 mm 2K25 Krasnopol laser-guided artillery munition. This round, with a range in excess of 40 km when fired from the 2S19 Msta-S, can strike within a few metres of its illuminated targets. At shorter ranges, it can even hit moving targets at speeds up to 36 km/h. It is an effective weapon and has become an important element of Russia’s counter-battery capability. It is not alone: the Z-16 and Orlans act as reconnaissance assets for weapons such as the Lancet loitering munition, which had damaged or destroyed around 1,000 Ukrainian howitzers and rocket launchers by April 2025. Countering Lancet and Orlan/Z-16 capabilities is also key for the UK, and engaging them with a missile is likely to be an appropriate response, given the harm they could inflict if left untouched. 

The British Army was planning to procure 12 of the Thales RAPIDRanger systems in 2024 as an interim capability to replace six of the Stormer vehicles donated to Ukraine. RAPIDRanger mounts Starstreak on a Vamtac 4×4. However, if more of these vehicles were seen as the preferred option for the SHORAD requirement, this would still leave the C-UAS element unresourced.

The GBAD requirement – C-UAS

The second half of the requirement has been described as a C-UAS capability, which is expected to be mounted on a second vehicle and armed with a medium calibre cannon. The type of cannon picked for this requirement will be important, but the ammunition selection will really define how effective it is. There are two approaches to medium calibre air defence that are worth considering; the first is an air bursting munition with a timed fuze. As the round enters the breech of the cannon, its fuze is programmed with data from the fire control system that accounts for the distance to the target, speed of the round and any lead required to compensate for movement of the target. This means that any sudden changes in movement are likely to disrupt the engagement and result in missed shots. 

The second approach is proximity fuzed rounds, which emit a signal – laser or radio frequency – to detect the presence of the target and then detonate at an optimal distance. The XM1211 proximity fuzed round from Northrop Grumman is designed to be fired from the company’s Bushmaster family of dual-feed cannons, none of which are in British service at present, and would require a new weapon system and ammunition to be introduced. However, it has demonstrated a high probability of kill against UAS type targets and is being fielded to US Army and Marine Corps short-range air defence units. 

Defending against class 1 drones is probably the most immediate and pressing threat. FPV technology developed and refined in Ukraine has proliferated to conflict zones around the world, and will likely continue to evolve and improve as a result. Using small drones for reconnaissance is also a proven and well-understood use case. Now, in Ukraine, the combination of reconnaissance drones and FPVs mean that it is very difficult to concentrate force for an offensive operation, which leads to heavy losses of vehicles and men. It also means that it is very difficult for either side to achieve success quickly by conducting a concerted offensive to break through the lines. 

The British Army has procured the Smash sight from Israeli company SmartShooter, and was expected to field 225 C-UAS sights on SA80A3 rifles in high readiness units by the end of 2023. This order provides some element of a last line of defence against small drones. It is far from perfect, but better than nothing. Additionally, Challenger 3 will integrate the Trophy active protection system into its design. With an upgrade, Trophy can also be used to intercept drones up to a class 2, which would significantly increase the survivability of the UK’s heavy armour.

Two vehicles vs one

Several competitors have come forward to try and meet the requirement, including Moog in partnership with Supacat. The two companies presented a Supacat HMT with an armoured cab and the Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP) at IAV earlier this year. The vehicle combined both the M230LF 30 mm cannon and Starstreak or LMM onto a single turret. “We feel that layered capabilities on a single platform offer much more choice for the user. It means that whatever is in the air, be that UAS or helicopters, the vehicle and crew will have something that can engage it,” Richard Allen-Miles, Moog’s EMEA Capture Lead told Calibre in an interview. Moog also partnered with KNDS to present its RIwP armed just with Starstreak on a Dingo 3, and several variants of the RIwP were presented during DSEI UK 2025, and there is also the RAPIDRanger from Thales to consider. 

Calibre comment

NATO armoured formations are likely to focus on preserving combat mass within their armoured formations as a means to compensate for their lack of numbers relative to Russian armed forces. This means using stand-off weapons like artillery and guided rockets to degrade Russia’s forward echelons before contact, but also protecting and shielding their armoured formations from the worst effects of Russia’s airpower. Systems like Lancet and the Ka-52 will cause excessive attrition if they cannot be intercepted, and Russia’s artillery will likely rely almost exclusively on its ISR drones to find targets. So, in this regard, missile-based, short-range air defence is incredibly important. Missiles can provide a very high kill probability against air targets, and will ensure that the British Army is able to respond to most ISR drones and helicopters that Russia would choose to field. Although the cost ratio of missiles to drones is unfavourable, the potential harm from being unable to shoot Russian ISR drones down, is far greater. 

Furthermore, consider how the spread of small drones could impact British forces deployed in a counter-insurgency operation: They might be watched as they move around their base or leave it, providing ample time to organise an ambush or IED. They might be bombed by small drones carrying grenades, or FPVs carrying RPG-7 warheads, destroying their armoured vehicles. In this way, a sub-peer force, such as those encountered by the British Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, could begin to shape and control operations and operational tempo, degrading the UK’s ability to act freely. As shown in Ukraine, the mass concerted use of FPVs and reconnaissance drones can lead to entire sections of infantry being wiped out, heavily armoured vehicles immobilised and destroyed, and howitzers hunted down and destroyed. 

It is clear that countering small drones is absolutely critical, and an element of the British Army’s requirements that must be resourced based on the effect – not the potential benefits to British industry or political relationships. Moreover, it must be resourced in full, providing enough systems to protect all the units that the UK’s 3 Division would intend to field at the very least. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on October 2, 2025. The lead image shows a Stormer Air Defence vehicle from 12th Regiment The Royal Regiment of Artillery  participating in an anti-air demonstration as part of pre-deployment training for OP CABRIT 16. The 12th Regiment represents half of the British Army’s SHORAD capability. Credit: AirTpr David Allen AAC/UK MOD © Crown copyright 2025.