Thales launches TopStar, resilient and sovereign PNT for Europe

The war in Ukraine has provided the forcing function necessary to get European states to take electronic warfare seriously. The Thales TopStar, provides a look at the potential future of assured PNT.  

By Sam Cranny-Evans, editor of Calibre Defence, published on April 21, 2026.  

Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) has launched a new positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) receiver called TopStar. Introduced in an April 16 press release, the device is designed for integration onto land platforms, drones, and munitions.  

The system has been designed to help ensure communications and navigation during deployments in “increasingly contested electronic warfare environments.” 

With that in mind, the TopStar uses sovereign European components, according to the press release, with assembly in France. This may mean that no chips are procured from the US or China.  

It is a dual-constellation receiver, able to work with the EU’s Galileo constellation as well as civilian GPS. This should offer some resilience, enabling the system to move between signals in response to jamming.  

TopStar and CRPAs 

TopStar employs a Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna (CRPA). You may be familiar with the term CRPA, Russia’s Geran drones carry up to 16 of them, requiring at least 16 jammers to defeat them.  

A CRPA is characterised by the number of discrete satellite navigation channels that it can process. The antenna works by receiving satellite signals individually and combining them. It then uses that combined signal to digitally “steer” the antenna away from the source of jamming. According to Thales, this means the TopStar can get up to 30 times closer to a source of jamming than a regular antenna.  

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Finally, Thales states that it can synchronise tactical radios for up to 48 hours after GPS has been lost. Conventional radio networks will begin to break down after around 30 minutes without a GPS signal. This happens for a number of reasons. One of which is that radio networks rely on precise timing to send and receive signals. If the satellite signal is jammed, the radios can no longer synchronise, and the network will eventually breakdown.  

In sum, a CRPA is a capable element of a PNT product, but it is a hungry resource. The ability to process several channels of satellite data simultaneously requires commensurate computing power. The more channels, the more computing power is needed to make the CRPA work. This does not put a block on their use, but it can increase the costs of procuring them. It may also increase the power requirements for the platforms and weapons that use them. 

Calibre comment: What are the EW threats?  

Russia is often painted as the pinnacle of the electronic warfare (EW) threat. This is not without reason. Russian EW forces are credited with degrading the efficacy of advanced western munitions in Ukraine. Things like the Excalibur 155 mm artillery shell, JADM-ER guided bomb, and M30 GMLRS rockets have all seen their efficacy reduced because of Russian GPS jamming.  

But the Russians are not alone, Iran and its proxies are also credited with GPS spoofing. And there is even evidence of Mexican cartels using jammers to facilitate their activities.  

In a nutshell, it is safe to say that assured PNT is a live and growing issue. However, it is worth noting that GPS jamming and denial have been problems for a long time. And Russian EW raised as an issue by at least one major academic review as far back as 2016. So, although it is good to see new solutions being introduced, it must be remembered that they are being driven in large part by what has happened in Ukraine. There is undoubtedly a customer draw and demand, but solutions could have been developed much sooner.  

The lead image shows a concept rendering of the TopStar integrated into a Griffon 6×6, drone, and munition. Credit: Thales