The Houthi dilemma: Why Yemen’s rebels are hesitating after the fall of Khamenei

After October 7, the Houthi movement was quick to add its weight to the crisis. By striking at ships in the Red Sea and launching missiles towards Israel, the Houthis complicated the western response. They are supplied and backed by Iran, which is why it would be logical to expect a  Houthi response to Operation Epic Fury and the death of Khamenei. However, the movement is facing several dilemmas with a lot at stake.

On Saturday February 28, two senior Houthi officials told several news outlets that they were planning to resume attacks in the Red Sea. The anonymous announcement alone caused disruption. An advisory was issued almost immediately by CMA CGM, a French shipping company: “Passage through the Suez Canal has been suspended until further notice, and vessels will be rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope.”

The Houthi official had warned that the first attack could be launched on Saturday night. And yet, this article is being written on Tuesday morning, there are no signs of an attack. “It is important to emphasise that official statements from ʿAbd al-Malik al-Houthi, the movement’s leader, and from the Ansar Allah Political Office have been more cautious. Limiting themselves to rhetorical expressions of solidarity and support,” Dr Luca Nevola, a senior analyst for Yemen and the Gulf at ACLED told Calibre Defence via email. 

This is an important distinction, official statements from the Houthis have been balanced and cautious. “Within the framework of our Islamic, moral, and principled solidarity with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and as part of our readiness for all developments, we will move across various activities,” al-Malik said on March 1. So, why are the Houthis being so cautious, when others like Hezbollah have keenly joined the conflict? 

A fragile peace with Saudi Arabia

In 2025 the Houthis were designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the US. This moved US measures against the group to the most extreme level possible. It sets the conditions for economic strangulation of the group. 

“The Houthis have been weakened by the FTO designation and appear ready to negotiate with Riyadh. They could have exploited the security vacuum in southern Yemen during the STC takeover but chose not to,” Dr Nevola explained. 

“The Israel-Hamas ceasefire marked a tipping point, reviving Houthi-Saudi peace talks and pushing the STC to seek advantage ahead of a possible settlement,” Dr Nevola told me in an earlier email. Then, in late-2025, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized 52% of the country, including oil producing regions in Yemen. 

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The Saudis responded with the Presidential Leadership Council conducting an offensive under Saudi airstrikes. The campaign was successful and Saudi Arabia announced the dissolution of the STC in January this year. All the while, the Houthis remained quiet, despite there being the opportunity to disrupt the process and take territory. 

“Riyadh is facing a severe domestic economic situation and is struggling to manage the South–South conference amid mounting tensions in IRG-controlled areas fuelled by STC remnants. There is little appetite for renewed war against the Houthis,” Dr Nevola added. This hints at what is perhaps the bigger issue: Both sides are tired after more than a decade of conflict. 

“What has deterred Riyadh (and Abu Dhabi) from confronting the Houthis since 2022 is the group’s long-range arsenal, which remains intact,” Nevola continued. “The Houthis have clearly signalled that, should domestic conflict resume, they would hold Saudi Arabia directly responsible and target it accordingly.”

What could the Houthis do? 

So, the Houthis could resume attacks on Saudi Arabia, adding their throw weight to Iran’s chaotic missile and drone strikes. But, as discussed above, it seems that both sides are keen for stability and some form of peace. 

But Dr Nevola went on to explain that this does not mean the Houthis will not join the fray. “A broad resumption of high-intensity attacks on Saudi territory remains less likely in the near term, given ongoing Saudi-Houthi backchannel discussions,” he said. However, “renewed strikes on Israel would represent the most immediate and symbolically coherent response.”

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So, Israel is one potential target. But, “the next phase could also involve renewed attacks on US military assets in the region, particularly naval vessels operating in or near the Red Sea,” Nevola noted. The US has military bases in Bahrain, for example, that could remain vulnerable to Houthi targeting. 

With all of this in mind, Dr Nevola also cautioned that the Houthis were likely to pursue a strategy of controlled escalation. The goal would be to reinforce deterrence without inviting the kind of catastrophic response brought down on them by the Gaza war. 

Calibre comment: Where do things go from here? 

It has been posited that the chaos of Iran’s strikes could unravel the US operation. This is certainly a potential outcome. The strikes on civilian areas and Middle Eastern countries could exceed the pain threshold of some states quite easily. Leading to pressure on Washington to draw the operation to a close. However, if the US and Israel are successful in running down Iran’s missile and drone stocks, and can provide greater air defence, they may be able to sooth those most concerned. In either scenario, the Houthis may stand to gain very little from getting involved. They could add symbolically to the Iranian strikes, but would struggle to turn the dial in Iran’s favour. Unless, of course, they managed to successfully hit a US aircraft carrier. As the only state to have fired anti-ship ballistic missiles in anger, they are perhaps one of the few that stand a chance. But, as noted above by Dr Nevola, there are also many reasons for the Houthis to do nothing. 

The lead image shows the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CVN 72), accompanied by two military supply ships, and two U.S. Coast Guard cutters in the Arabian Sea on Feb 6. CVN 72 has been providing   F/A-18 and F-35 flights in support of Operation Epic Fury. Credit: CENTCOM.