Third Su-34 batch of 2025 continues Russia’s rearmament

The Russian Aerospace Forces have taken delivery of the third batch of Su-34 in 2025 building upon another six deliveries reported in 2024, and three Su-35S deliveries this year, according to an August 12 press release. United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), the manufacturer of the aircraft, has been reporting its intent to increase production for some time and it appears to be bearing fruit with a steady drumbeat of orders now taking place. 

The quantity of aircraft is rarely revealed, but as with previous orders, it is possible to estimate the numbers based on imagery provided by UAC. Each of the three announcements this year have shown two aircraft, which indicates that at least six Su-34 have been manufactured and delivered, on top of the potential for 12 to have been delivered in 2024. 

It is worth noting that the delivery tempo accelerated towards the end of 2024 having started in April, there was one delivery in June, and then a delivery announced every month from September through to December. This could mean that UAC is on track to deliver more Su-34s this year than it did in the last, or that it is slightly ahead of its previous production schedule. The company is also involved in repairing Su-34 bombers that have been damaged in Ukraine. During that process, the aircraft are upgraded and modernised including a new communications link that allows the pilots to communicate directly with forces on the ground, according to an article published by Rostec in October 2024. 

The Su-34 is Russia’s most effective form of fixed wing close air support and routinely used to deploy the UMPK glide bombs. It can be fitted with a range of electronic counter-measures (ECM) that improve its survivability against Ukraine’s air defences. This includes detachable wingtip pods designated L265VI (receiver) and L265VP (jammer), with additional components internally mounted. 

Additional protection in the form of a UV-5 countermeasures dispenser, L-150 radar warning receiver, and L-150NU-34 anti-radiation missile targeting system. The self-defence suite also includes a UV-5 countermeasures dispenser system, L-150 RWR system and L-150NU-34 ARM targeting equipment as well as larger ECM pods carried in the centre of the aircraft fuselage. 

Together this means that it can work to suppress Ukrainian air defences using anti-radiation missiles, and deliver strikes against infrastructure using a range of weapons like the D-30SN. The D-30SN is a purpose-built guided glide bomb rather than a modified dumb bomb, it has a 100 kg warhead and uses inertial and satellite navigation enabling it to engage fixed targets. Initial reports indicated that it had a range of 90 km.

Calibre comment

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) would play a vital role for Russia in the event of war with NATO and it appears that the Su-34 and Su-35S will form the backbone of its air combat power should that happen. They are 4th generation aircraft but their long-range air-to-air capabilities and growing experience in the ground attack role would make them a real threat to a lot of NATO’s airpower. However, a lot would depend on the ability of the VKS, which also includes Russia’s ground-based air defences, to coordinate its defensive effort. If the air defence systems were tightly integrated with the airpower of the Su-34 and -35, then it would potentially be a very potent and capable force that NATO would have to dedicate significant resources to defeat. 

As noted by Dima Adamsky in his 2021 paper on Russian theories of victory in air defence:

“The Russian military sees repelling aerospace aggression as a holistic endeavor encapsulating all the strike and defensive capabilities aimed against all means of aerospace aggression (ASA), in their bases, in flight, and over the theaters of military operations.”

In essence, this would mean that Russia would combine long-range strike capabilities from all domains, including its nuclear triad, the air force and air defence forces to try and defeat NATO’s airpower. However, Adamsky also observed that political infighting within the Russian services had created cumbersome command and control verticals that would likely make execution of a Strategic Operation for Repelling Aerospace Aggression (SORASA – the proper term to describe Russian air defence strategy rather than A2/AD) difficult. Two of the crucial questions for Western forces that will come out of the Ukraine war is whether or not those command structures will improve, and whether Russian assumptions around the SORASA as a concept are still valid. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on August 15, 2025. Credit for the lead image is UAC.