Three observations from Iran’s drone strike on RAF Akrotiri

Iran’s drone strike on RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus should drive home the need for well-resourced air defence. This piece looks at three observations that can be taken from this event as far as air defence is concerned. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, editor of Calibre Defence, published on March 2, 2026. 

An Iranian drone hit the UK’s airbase in Cyprus on Sunday March 1st, according to the BBC. At around midnight local time, a single drone crashed into the base without causing casualties. It hit the base’s runway, according to Yvette Cooper, the UK’s foreign secretary confirmed.

The UK has intercepted a few missiles and drones since the US and Israeli strikes on Iran were initiated. One base in Iraq was targeted, and a Typhoon operating out of Qatar also intercepted a drone. There are also some reports of missiles flying in the direction of Cyprus, but it was not clear if they were targeting the island. 

Iran is clearly lashing out at those it sees as supporting the US in the Middle East. But the latest attacks also came shortly after the UK granted permission for the US to use the Diego Garcia base, one of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean, and RAF Fairford, Gloucestershire for its strikes.

The effects of the Iranian drone strike on Akrotiri seem to have been fairly minimal. But it does raise three observations that are relevant to the UK and others on the nature of drones, base defence, and airpower. 

No. 1: The drone will always get through 

Stanley Baldwin supposedly said, “the bomber will always get through.” He was giving a speech to the UK’s House of Commons called the Fear of the Future. His speech reflected the deep-seated anxiety of the interwar period regarding the development of military aviation. Baldwin basically argued that no power on earth could fully protect a population from massed airstrikes. 

He was of course proven right less than a decade later. 

So this seems like a good starting point for the observations from the strike on Akrotiri. A drone will always get through. 

Israeli jets are currently flying over Tehran, bombing directly with gravity bombs instead of long-range cruise missiles. So, it is also fair to argue that a bomber may also eventually get through. 

But very few state actors and no non-state actors have the equivalent to an F-35. Most of them, however, do have drones. And even in environments that are very dense with air defences, drones have proven their ability to get through. This includes: 

• Russia’s airbase in Syria, damaging several aircraft in 2018. 
• Abqaiq and Khurais Attack, which shut down 50% of Saudi Arabia’s oil production in 2019. 
• The Shahed waves against Ukraine, which accelerated from 2023, causing ever greater damage and air defence stress. 
• The Tower 22 Attack against US personnel in Jordan, 2024.

There are many more examples. The point here is that even with well-prepared bases and airspace that can often be described as permissive (i.e., the defending force could do what it wants), the drone still gets through. The strikes have been fairly benign, but the biggest strikes – against Israel and Ukraine – have faced intense air defence networks.

No 2. Layered air defence is key

This leads us to observation number 2, which is a no-brainer. Layered air defence is key. This means short-range cannon and missile defences, medium-range missiles, long-range missiles ideally, and early warning. Of course, some wrapper of electronic warfare is also helpful as well as a system to counter small drones. It is not clear what if any air defences are at RAF Akrotiri. But it is clear that Iran’s drone strike got through, which suggests that there is nothing standing and providing watch.

But the UK and many other forces have not invested in these capabilities. There are pockets of excellence, the Dutch armed forces are extensively modernising their air defences. And if those programmes are fully realised, they will provide a good measure of defence for some assets. Israel naturally has become a very well-defended country, and Saudi Arabia also has a good track record in air defence. 

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The UK is particularly bad, however, and tends to rely on its Typhoons for air defence. Which can be efficient, but clearly has its limits as an approach. So, the question is why is it taking the UK so long to address this problem? The reasons are complex and quite mundane at the same time. But part of the answer is money – air defence is expensive. 

Even so, investing in air defence is always a better solution than hoping the drone will not get through. Especially as it is worth noting that Russia is capable of launching 400 Shahed/Geran type drones in a night. Alongside large-scale use of cruise and ballistic missiles. The UK (and others) need to be able to protect their airbases from these types of strikes without relying on scrambling jets every time. The alternative is to essentially invite adversaries to mass effects against an airbase, hoping that they can achieve some kind of impressive defeat on a major power. 

No 3. Build hardened aircraft shelters

Observation number 3 is perhaps the least exciting: Build hardened aircraft shelters. Hardened aircraft shelters will protect an aircraft from a lot of things, including the weather. With blast proof doors and reinforced concrete structures, they could withstand cruise missile strikes and even the type of small drone operation launched by Ukraine. They are a sensible option for a lot of different reasons. 

For instance, activists from Palestine Action broke into RAF Brize Norton in 2025 and vandalised two A330 MRTT refueling and transport aircraft. That whole event would have been far less dramatic if the aircraft were housed in shelters. Yes, the A330 is pretty big, and a shelter would also be very big. But Palestine Action isn’t the only group that would be interested in destroying or damaging the aircraft.

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If Russia went to war with NATO, it is likely that its planners would look to destroy as much NATO airpower on the ground as possible. This would limit the alliance’s ability to respond and may even deter it from doing so. Air defence would be provided at an alliance level, but housing as many aircraft as possible in hardened shelters would minimise the impact of successful strikes. 

In the case of Iran’s drone strike on RAF Akrotiri, the damage was minimal but a Shahed-type munition hitting and destroying a Typhoon, would have significant political and military fallout. It is better to be safe than sorry.

Calibre comment: Priorities in the Defence Investment Plan 

There is a lot riding on the UK’s long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP). The DIP is supposed to set out the government’s funding for defence and explain how it will resource the commitments made in the Strategic Defence Review. But it has been repeatedly delayed, and now there are rumours that it may not be published at all. 

Whether published or not, it seems reasonably certain that the DIP will have to make trade-offs. The UK has too many gaps, too many big capabilities to resource, for everything to be funded. A convincing and rational argument could be made for prioritising the Royal Navy and Air Force. As services, they carry the most weight that would be useful in deterring Russia, or responding to Iran’s drone and missile strikes. 

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One element that would be key to protecting the RAF so that it could shape a war with either state, is air defence. Air defence is quite prosaic and straightforward when properly resourced. Hardened aircraft shelters, point defence, medium range defence, and good early warning. It can take years to build and is generally very expensive. But it is worth noting that non-state actors and state-based threats are increasingly capable of holding airbases at risk, including RAF Akrotiri.

Russia lost aircraft to drone strikes in 2018, US airbases throughout the Middle East have routinely been subjected to missile and drone strikes. Ukraine has successfully damaged many Russian aircraft deep inside Russia. And Israeli bases have suffered some successful attacks despite the country’s dense air defences. Altogether this should be enough evidence to drive investment in airbase defence. But it is sadly unlikely that this will come to pass. 

The lead image shows an F-35B inside an aircraft shelter at RAF Akrotiri. Credit: AS1 Amber Mayall RAF/UK MOD © Crown copyright 2026.