Type 26; the right choice for Norway’s ASW

The news of Norway’s £10 billion procurement of five Type 26 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigates broke on Sunday, August 31. No doubt some welcome news for the UK government, which has had a concerted export campaign around the Type 26 for some years now and more recently placed a lot of emphasis on the social value of defence.

With five of the vessels to be built for Norway, there will be 13 Type 26 ASW frigates operating in Northern Europe, including the eight that are being built for the UK. This represents a significant improvement in an area that has been sorely lacking. Calibre Defence spoke with Alex Luck, a freelance naval analyst and journalist to get his thoughts on the procurement and why it matters. 

Why the Type 26 and ASW matter

One of the early signs that Russia was becoming more aggressive and assertive in its stance towards NATO, was the way that it used its submarines. By 2018, the Russian submarine activity was already problematic, leading US Admiral James Foggo, Commander of US Naval Forces Europe, told 60 Minutes that, “they have a very capable submarine force, and we’ve seen an increase in submarine activity over the past few years that causes me pause…Suffice it to say that the Russians have increased their presence in all bodies of water around Europe and in the Atlantic.” Admiral Foggo refused to be drawn on whether or not his forces had ever lost the Severodvinsk, a Yasen-class sub, but Pentagon officials confirmed to 60 Minutes that in 2017 it had “slipped into the Atlantic Ocean, and for weeks evaded all attempts to find it.”

The Yasen-class is regarded as the quietest of Russia’s SSN fleet, but even the relatively old Kilo-class designs have caused issues in the past. This is because Russia has routinely pushed its SSNs out of the Northern Fleet’s bases in the greater Kola Bay area to patrol areas close to NATO shores. They have entered the Mediterranean, where the busy shipping lanes frustrated efforts to track them. On several occasions, Russian submarines have sailed through the Greenland, Iceland, UK (GIUK) Gap into and evaded detection for some time. 

Additionally, Russia’s ballistic missile (SSBN) and nuclear attack submarines (SSN) have started operating under the Arctic ice for much longer periods of time, for instance. The Yasen-class Krasnoyarsk (K-571) and Borei-class Imperator Aleksandr III sailed from the Barents Sea under the Arctic ice cap to Kamchatka Peninsula in 2024, completing a journey of 4,000 nautical miles. They were not the first to do so; three SSBNs surfaced from under the Arctic ice in March 2021 as part of an exercise known as Umka-21. Soviet submarines did this too, but the Russians routinely surface and operate under thicker ice, which indicates that SSBNs could be deployed deeper into the Arctic, placing them further from NATO ASW assets, and reducing the need for the SSNs to protect them. 

This is important for Russia’s Northern Fleet. It is widely reported to include eight SSBNs from the Delta IV and Borei-classes, and as many as 16 SSNs from a variety of classes, including three Yasen-class boats. Whenever NATO has to track a Russian submarine, it has to commit a plethora of assets to the task and one concern is that should the Northern Fleet surge its assets through the GIUK Gap, it would generate far more tracks than NATO navies could keep up with, especially if the US involvement were reduced. Take the recent reports from late August of efforts to find a Russian submarine that had threatened the USS Gerald R Ford Carrier Strike Group, for instance. The UK, Norway, and the US reportedly scrambled at least 12 P-8A Poseidon aircraft to look for the submarine in the Norwegian Sea, completing 27 sorties in under 48 hours.

This reflects the level of effort to find just one submarine in what is a relatively small sea, at just 1.38 million square kilometres. There are a range of efforts to improve NATO’s capacity for ASW and threat detection, including the UK’s Project CABOT, which anticipates a network of autonomous sensors providing persistent ISR in areas of concern, as well as the eight Type 26s that are in production. Denmark has procured the SkyGuardian MQ-9B for naval reconnaissance, and Sweden has commissioned Saab to develop a large uncrewed underwater vessel (LUUV) to support its ASW defence. And this is the context that matters for Norway’s Type 26 procurement. NATO forces are stretched thin in the Northern Atlantic when it comes to ASW. They can manage in peacetime, but have frequently struggled to keep up with Russian submarines even then. So, there is a lot of pressure to develop and procure the right capabilities now, before the likelihood of a real confrontation increases. 

The Type 26, the right choice?

“Norway in particular was also looking at broader cooperation, both in industrial and operational terms,” Alex Luck explained, picking up on Norway’s requirements for the programme.  “These aspects mattered a lot in the final choice, and the UK was arguably best set up from a historical perspective to take this home. They have both an established regular defence cooperation with Norway and overlapping geographic interests in terms of anti-submarine warfare and wider surveillance and patrol activities,” he explained. 

International cooperation is key to ASW, with the recent scramble to track a Russian submarine using P-8As standing as a good example. As an asset-intensive task, if multiple nations commit to a tracking operation, then the number of assets that can focus on finding the submarine increases, and with it the probability of success. It is therefore natural for Norway to want to work with the UK and its neighbours on tracking and monitoring Russian submarines, and the Type 26 procurement will help to deepen that relationship. 

“As for the designs in question, I do think on paper Type 26 was the most compelling offer: It is a bespoke ASW design. The ships are under construction and relatively close to entering service with the Royal Navy. And, overall, despite some weight growth, the development risk is marginal,” Alex explained. Alongside capability, the maturity of designs across the board in defence is a key consideration that can significantly shape a procurement, especially when it is of a large capital project with a delivery phase likely spanning a decade or more. 

In that respect, the Type 26 had several benefits over its competitors. “Germany offered the MEKO A-400 AMD, a design that had to be further adapted for ASW to meet Norwegian expectations, but it is not yet under construction. France offered the FDI, the most compact design emphasising automation and affordability over size, space and outright capability,” Alex continued. He added that although FDI is operational and in production (unlike the MEKO A-400), including for one export customer, it has some design aspects that are second best to the Type 26. “And the aforementioned political and operational factors, in my view, were not in France’s favour,” he said. 

The final competitor was the American Constellation-class, which is based on the design of the European multi-purpose frigate or FREMM. The programme was launched in 2017 with a first contract in 2020. However, by 2025, the lead ship of the class was reported to be only 10% complete, and the design was not yet finalised or approved. “Despite being a capable platform on paper and offering cooperation with the most important security and industrial partner for European NATO-countries, I felt this ship was the least likely to win,” Alex suggested, before explaining that, “both because Constellation is currently experiencing drastic development difficulties as consequence of a questionably managed program. But also because the US does not have the available capacity to provide Norway with hulls on time.”

The Fincantieri Wisconsin shipyard that is building the Constellation-class has faced persistent challenges with its workforce and supply chain. And the design of the class now has just 15% commonality with the original FREMM, all of which has resulted in a 3-years delay in the delivery of the first ship. “Incidentally the same issue will be challenging even for the UK,” Alex said. “And it now appears to be the case that Royal Navy will pass on one of its Type 26 hulls to Oslo, in order to meet the delivery timeline. This illustrates that even the winning bid could face further challenges if they are to stay on target for cost and schedule,” he finished by saying. 

BAE has overcome a lot of the shipyard and skills issues that were encountered in the early 2000s as it set out to build the UK’s new submarines. It contracts hull construction of the Type 26 out to three ship yards, and between the contracts from the UK, Australia, and Canada, five ships are currently under construction. Two, HMS Glasgow and HMS Cardiff have completed the build phase and are being fitted out, with an expected in-service date of 2028. This means that the production facilities are very much live and have gathered momentum, however, Glasgow and Cardiff were laid down in 2017 and 2019 respectively. An in-service date of 2028 for both indicates a 9-11 year build time. 

Delivery of the Type 26 to Norway is expected to begin in 2030, and the partnership will also open up opportunities for industrial cooperation. “The draft agreement between the two countries includes a guarantee of UK industrial cooperation with Norwegian industry equivalent to the total value of the acquisition,” the Norwegian MoD said. This should not disrupt the build time of the Norwegian Type 26 significantly, but with first deliveries expected just five years after the contract was placed, it does seem likely that HMS Belfast, the third ship of the UK’s Type 26 order, or possibly HMS Birmingham may have to be diverted to meet the required deadlines. 

Calibre comment

Addressing Russia’s sub-surface capabilities is essential to deterrence and in wartime. Its submarines can deliver considerable long-range missile strikes, holding European cities, infrastructure, and defence bases at risk. This boost in ASW vessels is, therefore, very welcome and a good step for NATO. It will likely have to be complemented with the autonomous projects that are underway, as well as a maintenance of the P-8A Poseidon fleet at the very least. 

By Sam Cranny-Evans, published on September 4, 2025. Credit for the lead image is LPhot Bill Spurr/UK MOD © Crown copyright 2024. It shows HMS Glasgow making its way to Scotstoun shipyard after being successfully floated on the Clyde in 2022.