A P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft from the Royal Air Force flies a mission looking for Russian submarines off the coast of scotland.

UK details operation to counter Russian submarine activity in North Atlantic

The British MoD has released details of an operation to counter a Russian submarine activity, led by the GUGI, off the coast of the UK.

By Sam Cranny-Evans, editor of Calibre Defence, published on April 9, 2026.

The Royal Navy and Air Force have spent a month tracking and monitoring Russian submarines in a dedicated operation to stop them from sabotaging the UK’s underwater infrastructure. Russian submarines were found to be operating in the UK’s exclusive economic zone, as well as in the waters of allies, the Minister of Defence, John Healey, explained during an April 9 briefing.

Working with allies, the UK deployed its P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine warfare aircraft, as well as a vessel. They tracked the Akula class sub and two submarines from the Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (known as GUGI) in an operation lasting more than a month.

The aircraft flew more than 450 hours, and the frigate travelled thousands of miles, Healey said. Adding, “I’m making this statement to call out this Russian activity. And to President Putin I say, we see you, we see your activity over our cables and our pipelines, and you should know that any attempt to damage them will not be tolerated and will have serious consequences.”

It was assessed that the Akula class was a distraction, and effort focused on the GUGI vessels, he said. The British forces demonstrated to the Russian submarines that they were monitoring them by dropping sonobuoys and tracking them. The minister emphasised that this was to show the Russians that they knew where they were.

This is a common tactic in monitoring and deterring Russian activity. A frigate might sail very close to a submarine, for example, forcing it to remain submerged. This increases the pressure of the crew and limits their endurance.

What were the Russian submarines doing?

A satellite image showing the main base of the GUGI.

A satellite image showing the main base of the GUGI. Credit: UK MoD.

The minister went on to emphasise that this underwater infrastructure, which includes communications cables and energy infrastructure, is critical to the UK and its way of life. “The fact that it matters elevates it as a target to our adversaries,” he said.

GUGI is designed specifically to conduct sabotage operations of deep-sea infrastructure and is believed to be tasked directly by Putin. GUGI operates a range of deep-diving submarines, such as the titanium-hulled Losharik, Paltus and X-Ray, which can operate at extreme depths, where the impact of sabotage would be particularly difficult to repair. It also operates vessels such as the Belgorog (a stretched Oscar-class submarine, which acts as a mothership for vessels like the Losharik) and surface vessels such as the Yantar, which can act as operational hubs for deep-diving, remotely operated vehicles like the Harpsichord.

GUGI is thought to be responsible for carrying out sabotage operations that could severely disrupt communications. However, it is worth noting – and Healey emphasised this – that underwater infrastructure is quite resilient.

So, there is plenty to be gained by simply surveying and monitoring that infrastructure to understand what is where.

The UK’s response to the submarine threat

07 Sep 2025 - Wildcat Helicopters from 815 Naval Air Squadron, flies past UK Carrier HMS Prince of Wales, carrying a Sea Venom medium-weight anti-ship missile.

HMS Prince of Wales at sea during its 2025 deployment. Credit: UK MoD/Crown Copyright.

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a core role of the Royal Navy, and something that it constantly deploys vessels to support. To resource that mission, Healey explained that the UK will be deploying its carrier group to the high North in 2026.

At the same time, the Labour government is funding the Atlantic Bastion under Project CABOT, an effort to build an autonomous network of sensors in the North Atlantic. This will, in theory, provide an element of persistence to the ASW sensor network.

The UK has procured a fleet of nine P-8A Poseidons and invested hundreds of millions in the infrastructure to support the aircraft. It is increasingly cooperating with Germany and the US on P-8 deployments in the North Atlantic.

Furthermore, the UK and Norway are both procuring the Type 26 ASW frigate, which will revamp and refresh ASW capabilities in both countries. However, the delivery timelines are extended with first deliveries to the UK in 2028, and to Norway in 2030. It will therefore be some time before both nations have the full 13 ship complement that the investment entails.

Calibre comment:  The Defence Investment Plan and difficult trade-offs

The defence minister was asked about the Defence Investment Plan several times following the briefing. This is understandable, the plan is seen as the gateway to British investment in defence and its release is delayed. However, few seem to spare much thought for why it is delayed. One option is that the plan is considering difficult trade-offs. For example, the UK is facing a significant funding gap and has made commitments under the Strategic Defence Review that would add to it.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the CDS, has said that the planned modernisation is unaffordable under the current budget. This likely means that without a very real uplift in spending, the UK is going to have to reduce its ambitions.

Leaving aside the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which has a ring-fenced budget, there are two capabilities that stand out as paramount: ASW, and airpower, specifically suppression of enemy air defence and offensive counter-air capabilities. If the UK and its allies are unable to successfully track Russia’s submarines at scale, then a critical element of NATO’s deterrence posture that would be weakened. Equally, if the RAF and NATO forces cannot break Russian air defences, and destroy Russian strike assets on the ground, it will be difficult for NATO to withstand all the long-range strikes that Russia could conceivably deploy.

Resourcing these requirements, perhaps followed by air defence, would be the most sensible options for the British MoD if further funding is not available. This would of course mean uncomfortable decisions around the funding for the British Army, and perhaps even its aircraft carriers.

Lead image shows an RAF P-8A Poseidon flying off the coast of Scotland in 2021. Credit: Cpl Adam Fletcher/UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021.

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